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Abstract
Background: Streptococcus pneumoniae is capable of causing multiple infectious syndromes and occasionally
causes outbreaks. The objective of this review is to update prior outbreak reviews, identify control measures, and
comment on transmission.
Methods: We conducted a review of published S. pneumoniae outbreaks, defined as at least two linked cases of S.
pneumoniae.
Results: A total of 98 articles (86 respiratory; 8 conjunctivitis; 2 otitis media; 1 surgical site; 1 multiple), detailing 94
unique outbreaks occurring between 1916 to 2017 were identified. Reported serotypes included 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7F, 8,
12F, 14, 20, and 23F, and serogroups 6, 9, 15, 19, 22. The median attack rate for pneumococcal outbreaks was 7.0%
(Interquartile range: 2.4%, 13%). The median case-fatality ratio was 12.9% (interquartile range: 0%, 29.2%). Age
groups most affected by outbreaks were older adults (60.3%) and young adults (34.2%). Outbreaks occurred in
crowded settings, such as universities/schools/daycares, military barracks, hospital wards, and long-term care
facilities. Of outbreaks that assessed vaccination coverage, low initial vaccination or revaccination coverage was
common. Most (73.1%) of reported outbreaks reported non-susceptibility to at least one antibiotic, with non-
susceptibility to penicillin (56.0%) and erythromycin (52.6%) being common. Evidence suggests transmission in
outbreaks can occur through multiple modes, including carriers, infected individuals, or medical devices. Several
cases developed disease shortly after exposure (< 72 h). Respiratory outbreaks used infection prevention (55.6%),
prophylactic vaccination (63.5%), and prophylactic antibiotics (50.5%) to prevent future cases. PPSV23 covered all
reported outbreak serotypes. PCV13 covered 10 of 16 serotypes. For conjunctival outbreaks, only infection
prevention strategies were used.
Conclusions: To prevent the initial occurrence of respiratory outbreaks, vaccination and revaccination is likely the
best preventive measure. Once an outbreak occurs, vaccination and infection-prevention strategies should be
utilized. Antibiotic prophylaxis may be considered for high-risk exposed individuals, but development of antibiotic
resistance during outbreaks has been reported. The short period between initial exposure and development of
disease indicates that pneumococcal colonization is not a prerequisite for pneumococcal respiratory infection.
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Background
Discovered in 1881 independently by Louis Pasteur and
George Sternberg [1], Streptococcus pneumoniae is a
Gram-positive bacterial pathogen that may asymptomat-
ically colonize the upper respiratory tract and is capable
of causing infections including conjunctivitis, otitis
media, lower respiratory tract infections, bacteremia,
and meningitis [2]. Those at particularly high risk for in-
vasive disease are young children, older adults, and per-
sons with underlying comorbidities [3, 4]. Among
United States (US) adults ≥50 years, it is estimated that
S. pneumoniae causes ≥500,000 cases of pneumonia
and ≥ 25,000 deaths each year [5]. Previous publications
describing pneumococcal disease state that nasopharyn-
geal colonization is a prerequisite for disease [2, 6, 7].
Colonization is “the presence and multiplication of mi-
croorganisms without tissue invasion or damage” [8].
Conversely, infection involves tissue invasion.
The objective of this review was to summarize the
publications on outbreaks and inform the understanding
of S. pneumoniae transmission in these outbreaks. The
most recent review of general pneumococcal outbreaks
was conducted in 2010 [9]. Since then, the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) has re-
vised its recommendations to include the use of
13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) in
adults [10]. Our review represents an important update
to previous reviews, includes additional pneumococcal
disease manifestations, and has over double the number
of included articles from the previous review. This re-
view informs the understanding of Streptococcus pneu-
moniae outbreak serotypes, transmission, and effective
control measures.
Methods
A search of PubMed was conducted on July 18, 2017, for
publications describing outbreaks of disease caused by S.
pneumoniae. The following search terms were used:
(“streptococcus pneumoniae” OR “pneumococcus”) AND
(“outbreak” OR “epidemic”) with no date restrictions. Arti-
cles not available in the English language were excluded.
All types of pneumococcal disease, year of outbreak, or lo-
cation of outbreak were eligible for inclusion. To be con-
sidered an outbreak, at least one transmission event of
pneumococcal disease had to occur. Pneumococcal car-
riage or surveillance studies were included if details of a
pneumococcal outbreak were described. Each included ar-
ticle’s references and previous reviews [9, 11, 12] were
screened for additional articles not identified.
The following information was extracted from publica-
tions. Case-patient ages were groups into five categories;
toddler (0–2 years old), children (3–17), young adults
(18–25), adults (26–49) and older adults (50+). S. pneu-
moniae were considered antibiotic susceptible or
non-susceptible, where non-susceptible refers to inter-
mediate or resistant. Specific antibiotic susceptibility in-
formation was extracted for penicillin, cefotaxime,
erythromycin, tetracycline, levofloxacin, and vanco-
mycin. The three general control measures considered
were antibiotic prophylaxis, prophylactic vaccination,
and infection prevention (i.e., hand-hygiene, isolation of
cases, isolation of carriers, social distancing). Outbreak
settings were categorized as occurring in hospitals, mili-
tary, long term care facilities (LTCF), daycares, schools,
jails, or workplaces. Settings falling outside these cat-
egories were grouped as “community” outbreaks.
Pneumococcal lower respiratory tract infections were di-
vided into three eras; pre-vaccine (pre-1977), pneumo-
coccal polysaccharide vaccine (PPSV) only (1977–1999),
and PPSV and PCV vaccines (2000–2017).
Results
The search identified 629 potential articles. After screen-
ing, 83 articles were identified as meeting the inclusion
criteria. From references of included articles and other
reviews an additional 15 articles were identified. A total
of 98 publications detailing 94 unique S. pneumoniae
outbreaks were identified (Table 1, Additional file 1:
Figure S1). Thirteen reports were published from 1916
to 1946, and the remainder were published after 1980.
Unique outbreaks by disease syndrome were as follows;
80 lower respiratory tract infection [12–97], 9 conjunc-
tivitis [98–105], 3 otitis media [106, 107], 1 surgical site
infection [108], and 1 lower respiratory tract infection
and otitis media [109] (Fig. 1).
A majority of reported outbreaks occurred in hospitals
(33.0%), community (26.6%), or military buildings (17.0%)
(Fig. 2). The most common age categories for case-patients
in outbreaks (n = 73) were older adults (60.3%), young
adults (34.2%) and adults (28.8%). Case-patients were less
commonly toddlers (20.5%) or children (19.2%). Most re-
ported outbreaks were reported in the US (43.6%), the
United Kingdom (24.5%), or Canada (7.4%). France, India,
and Israel each reported four outbreaks (4.3%); Japan,
Australia, Netherlands, and Hungary each reported two
outbreaks (2.1%); and Tunisia, Poland, and Finland each re-
ported one outbreak (1.1%).
Sixty-one outbreak investigations reported assessing S.
pneumoniae strains by molecular typing. The most com-
mon methods used were pulse-field-gel-electrophoresis
(PFGE) (23.2%), antisera methods (23.2%), and
multi-locus-sequence-typing (MLST) (22.0%). Of outbreak
reports published since 2007 (n = 18), MLST (40.6%) and
PFGE (18.8%) were most commonly used. Of 52 outbreaks
assessing antibiotic resistance, 73.1% of outbreaks re-
ported some antibiotic non-susceptibility. Antibiotics
chosen for susceptibility testing were inconsistent.
Non-susceptibility to penicillin (28/50 outbreaks),
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erythromycin (20/38), and tetracycline (11/20) were re-
ported. Fewer outbreaks reported non-susceptibility to
cefotaxime (5/13) or levofloxacin (3/11).
Non-susceptibility to vancomycin was not reported for
any outbreak (n = 17).
Disease types
Lower respiratory tract infection
A total of 81 unique reported outbreaks involved lower
respiratory tract infection with pneumococcus, with 9 in
the pre-vaccine era, 41 in the PPSV era and 31 in the
PPSV/PCV era.
Pre-vaccine era Within the pre-vaccine era, outbreaks
occurred in community (4/9), military (2/9), hospital (2/
9), and a school (1/9) settings. Interestingly, 3 of the out-
break reports mentioned concocting a vaccine from
pneumococcal polysaccharides [16, 18, 20].
PPSV era During the PPSV era, reported outbreaks oc-
curred in hospitals (43.9%), community (19.5%), LTCF
(17.1%), daycares (9.8%), military (7.3%) or jail (2.4%)
settings. Within hospital settings, outbreaks occurred in
geriatric, pulmonary, oncology, maternity, and “AIDS--
care” units. Community outbreaks included homeless
shelter outbreaks, transmission between family mem-
bers, and outbreaks occurring within socially disadvan-
taged groups. Of the 39 outbreaks that reported
serotypes, the most common pneumococci were ser-
ogroup 9 (15.4%), serotype 1 (15.4%), serotype 23F
(12.8%), and serotype 14 (12.8%) (Fig. 3). Of the 17 stud-
ies that reported colonization data, the median percent
of colonized individuals was 9.3% (IQR: 3.0%, 19.0%).
For 15 studies with a denominator, the median attack
rate was 7.4% (IQR: 4.4%, 12.8%) with a median
case-fatality ratio of 25.0% (IQR: 11.5%, 36.1%) from 24
studies. Twenty-six studies reported conducting testing
for resistance to at least one antibiotic.
Non-susceptibility was reported for the following antibi-
otics; penicillin (18/25), cefotaxime (5/9), erythromycin
(9/19), tetracycline (8/11), levofloxacin (2/3), and other
antibiotics (13/17). No vancomycin non-susceptibility
was reported in 13 publications. Seven outbreaks re-
ported sufficient information to calculate the vaccination
coverage of the source population with the following
Fig. 1 Reported Streptococcus pneumoniae outbreaks by anatomical
site. LRTI: Lower respiratory tract infection. LRTI was divided into
three eras; pre-vaccine (pre-1977), pneumococcal polysaccharide
vaccine only (1977–1999), and pneumococcal polysaccharide and
conjugate vaccines (2000–2017)
Fig. 2 Streptococcus pneumoniae outbreaks by setting. LTCF: Long-
term care facility. Graphic includes outbreaks from all anatomical
sites (94 outbreaks)
Fig. 3 Pneumococcal lower respiratory tract infection outbreak
serotypes and coverage by pneumococcal vaccines. Green: both the
13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) and 23-valent
pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (PPSV23) cover the indicated
serotype. Blue: only PPSV23 covers the indicated serotype. Hatched
bars indicate serogroups that have subtypes covered by the
vaccines, but the specific serotype within the serogroup was not
consistently reported across publications. The graph is subdivided by
vaccine era; PPSV only (1977–1999) and PPSV/PCV (2000–2017)
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coverages; 2% [110], 3% [55], two with 4% [52, 110], 7%
[42], and 24% [70]. One study reported an unadjusted
vaccine effectiveness (VE) of 0.87 (95% CI: -0.03, 0.98)
for those who received PPSV before the outbreak [70].
For hospital outbreaks with reported control measures
(11/18), infection-prevention practices alone (54.5%),
vaccination alone (9.1%), infection-prevention and vac-
cination (18.2%), infection-prevention and prophylactic
antibiotics (9.1%), and all three (9.1%) were used to miti-
gate outbreaks. Only two outbreaks (infection control
alone [64], all three control measures [70]) reported con-
trol measures as unsuccessful. Both outbreaks described
the development of antibiotic resistance over the course
of the outbreak [64, 70]. LTCF reported infection-
prevention and vaccination (2), infection-prevention and
antibiotics (1), and all three (1) as control measures with
cases discontinuing after implementation. Two of three
daycares that used antibiotics alone reported failure of
control measures to eradicate carriage of the outbreak
strain. For outbreaks designated as within communities,
a homeless men’s shelter controlled an outbreak success-
fully using vaccination. None of the other community
outbreaks reported using control measures.
PPSV/PCV era From 2000 to 2017, outbreaks were re-
ported in hospitals (25.8%), military settings (25.8%),
communities (22.6%), LTCF (12.9%), schools (6.5%), a
workplace (3.2%), and a jail (3.2%). Hospital outbreaks
occurred in geriatric, pulmonary, ear/nose/throat, and a
pediatric psychiatry ward. Community outbreaks in-
cluded a homeless shelter outbreak, transmission among
children, and a socially disadvantaged group. Of out-
breaks with recorded case-patient ages (n = 29), 55.2%
were older adults, 48.3% were young adults, 37.9% were
adults, 27.6% were children, and 10.3% were toddlers.
Twenty-seven outbreaks reported serotypes, with sero-
type 5 (18.5%) and serotype 1 (14.8%) most commonly
reported (Fig. 3). Of 10 outbreaks with a denominator
for colonization, the median colonization percentage
was 8.2% (IQR: 2.9%, 20.7%). The median attack rate
was 7.7% (IQR: 1.2%, 40.5%) for the ten outbreaks that
provided attack rates. The case-fatality ratio was 4.5%
(IQR: 0%, 21.9%) for 18 reports. Seventeen studies re-
ported testing for antibiotic resistance with 64.7%
reporting resistance to at least one antibiotic. Reported
antibiotic non-susceptibility included; penicillin (5/16),
erythromycin (5/11), tetracycline (2/5), levofloxacin (1/
4), and other antibiotics (5/9). No non-susceptibility was
reported for cefotaxime (n = 3) and vancomycin (n = 2).
Twelve studies assessed whether case-patients had ever
received either pneumococcal vaccine before the out-
break [62, 66, 67, 71, 73, 74, 82, 88, 89, 91, 93, 97]. Of
the studies that provided enough information to calcu-
late vaccination coverage of the source population of
cases, two reported 0% coverage [66, 88], one reported
7% [89], and one reported 57% [93]. At least one vaccine
failure was reported for 6 studies [71, 74, 88, 91, 93, 97].
Two reports described one case-patient vaccine failure
of a vaccine received within five years of the outbreak
[71, 74]. Two studies reported PPSV VE among older
adults; 1.00 (95% CI: 0.30, 1.00) [63] and − 0.41 (95% CI:
-2.33, 0.40) [93]. The poor VE and the outbreak occur-
ring despite 57% vaccination coverage was partially at-
tributed to “waning immunity” by the authors, since all
case-patients received the vaccine more than 7 years
prior to the outbreak [93]. Of hospital outbreaks with re-
ported control measures (6/8), the following measures
were used; infection-prevention alone (16.7%), vaccin-
ation alone (16.7%), infection-prevention and prophylac-
tic antibiotics (50.0%), and vaccination and prophylactic
antibiotics (16.7%). None of the six outbreaks reported
the control measures failing to control the outbreak.
Military outbreaks were effectively controlled by antibi-
otics alone (1), infection control alone (1), antibiotics
and vaccination (3), infection-prevention and antibiotics
(3) or all three (1). All five LTCF outbreaks were con-
trolled with vaccination paired with infection control (2),
antibiotics (2), or both (1). Community outbreaks
reporting control measures (5/7), all used vaccination
alone. All outbreaks except one were reported as being
successfully controlled.
Conjunctivitis
Eight publications describing nine conjunctivitis out-
breaks have been published since 1982. All of these out-
breaks are attributed to non-typeable strains. Two
pneumococcal outbreaks were MLST sequence type 448
[101, 104]. Interestingly, this pneumococcal strain, iden-
tified in the 2002 Dartmouth and 2003 Minnesota out-
breaks, was related to a strain isolated in 1980’s
outbreaks in New York, California, and Illinois [98, 99,
101, 104]. Noteworthy is the development of
non-susceptibility to penicillin, erythromycin, and tetra-
cycline between 1980 to 2003 in this strain. Four of six
outbreaks reported non-susceptibility to at least one
antibiotic [98, 100, 103, 104]. Non-susceptibility was ob-
served for erythromycin (4/6), penicillin (2/6) and tetra-
cycline (1/4). Outbreaks occurred in the community (N
= 6) or military settings (N = 3). Three of the community
outbreaks were associated with universities, with two
large outbreaks occurring in this setting. Furthermore,
all outbreaks with reported ages (n = 5) included young
adult case-patients. Outbreaks of conjunctivitis were
generally larger than respiratory outbreaks (median: 561
cases; range 80, 735). There was no reported mortality
associated with these outbreaks. Five outbreaks reported
using infection-prevention to control outbreaks and led
to a subsequent decline in cases [100, 101, 103–105].
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However, for three of the four outbreaks related to
schools, the decline occurred after school breaks [100,
101, 105], complicating the attribution of
infection-prevention strategies as ending the outbreak.
Otitis media
There were four reported otitis media outbreaks in three
publications. The first was an otitis media outbreak oc-
curring simultaneously with a pneumococcal lower re-
spiratory tract infection outbreak in a US community in
1937 [109]. This study was unable to directly link the
two manifestations of pneumococcal disease. Two out-
breaks occurred in hospitals in Hungary during 1993–
1994 and 1996 [106]. No carriers were reported among
healthcare personnel and transmission was believed to
occur between patients in the hospital since
case-patients shared rooms. The other outbreak oc-
curred in 1997 in a Japanese daycare center among
seven children with serogroup 6 (n = 1), and serotypes
19 (n = 4), and 23F (n = 2) [107]. Otitis media occurred
in at least one case-patient during two pneumococcal
lower respiratory tract infection outbreaks [48, 61].
Non-susceptibility was reported for penicillin (3/3) and
erythromycin (2/2). None of the publications reported
instituting control measures.
Surgical-site
One publication detailed four surgical site infections
transmitted by a surgeon with nasopharyngeal carriage
to four prostatic surgery patients [108]. Pneumococcal
infection occurred at skin and soft tissue near the surgi-
cal site of case-patients. Transmission was attributed to
the surgeon persistently wearing a poorly fitting mask.
Transmission
In the reviewed outbreak articles, we found evidence for
multiple modes of transmission. Aside from transmis-
sion attributable to nasopharyngeal carriers, there were
pneumococcal lower respiratory tract infection out-
breaks suggestive of device-associated transmission (in-
fant resuscitation device [30]; inhaler [50, 97]), and
infection transmission without any carriers detected [27,
28, 33, 39, 46, 65, 97]. While it is near impossible to ever
fully rule out transient nasopharyngeal colonization as
the source, these outbreaks found no evidence that car-
riers contributed to transmission. There is also evidence
that droplet transmission occurs for S. pneumoniae. In a
neonatal intensive care unit, transmission occurred be-
tween two neonates 2 meters apart who had no overlap-
ping nursing staff, no contact between families, no
carriage among family member, and infection of the
transmitting neonate occurred before admission [65].
Studies also reported co-circulation of other viral [51,
76, 87, 91, 95] or bacterial respiratory tract pathogens
[44, 59, 84, 87] preceding or during a pneumococcal out-
break. For conjunctivitis outbreaks, direct droplet, or in-
direct (i.e. environment or hand contamination)
transmission may also have occurred, because having a
roommate with conjunctivitis was associated with devel-
oping conjunctivitis [101]. In four outbreaks, time from
exposure to infection in several outbreaks was less
72 hours for at least one case-patient [27, 28, 65, 97].
Serotype 1, 5, and 9 V exhibited short times between ex-
posure and disease.
Discussion
In our review, we found multiple outbreaks attributable
to S. pneumoniae reported in the first half of the 1900s.
In the beginning of the antibiotic area, there were no
publications regarding pneumococcal outbreaks. One ex-
planation for this observation is that outbreaks went un-
reported or unrecognized due to widespread antibiotic
use while antibiotics were exquisitely effective. After the
1980’s, outbreaks began being reported regularly, with
most reporting non-susceptibility to at least one anti-
biotic. A majority of pneumococcal outbreaks are linked
to lower respiratory tract infection but several large con-
junctivitis outbreaks due to non-typeable strains have re-
cently occurred. Most reported lower respiratory tract
infection outbreaks have occurred in hospitals, perhaps
due to observation bias. Conjunctivitis outbreaks have
mostly occurred in community settings, specifically uni-
versities. Regarding transmission, this review supported
the view of S. pneumoniae transmission as a complicated
process occurring by multiple modes (Fig. 4), and drop-
let precautions may be warranted for symptomatic pa-
tients due to the evidence of droplet transmission
occurring [65]. Recommendation for droplet precautions
is in line with American Public Health Association for
patients with antibiotic-resistant pneumococcus [111],
but differs from US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) and Red Book’s recommendation of
standard precautions for pneumococcus cases [112,
113]. For infection progression in individuals, we
reviewed several studies that development of pneumo-
coccal disease occurred with 72 h of initial exposure to
S. pneumoniae [27, 28, 65, 97]. Such a short time be-
tween exposure and infection suggests that colonization
is not a prerequisite for pneumococcal disease, and in-
fection can progress directly from initial exposure. Based
on these observations, we propose a new conceptual
model for pneumococcal lower respiratory tract infec-
tion progression within an individual (Fig. 5). After ini-
tial exposure, an individual may develop infection
directly or become colonized. A colonized individual can
either develop disease or develop immunity to the
pneumococcal serotype. After this point, pneumococcal
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respiratory infection progresses as has been described
previously [2].
Of the serotypes reported in pneumococcal lower re-
spiratory tract infection outbreaks, the reported strains
are considered high risk for serious disease manifestation
[114]. Specifically, increased empyema/parapneumonic
effusion (serotype 1), meningitis (serotypes 12, 23F), and
fatality (serotypes 14, 23F). These strains have continued
to be reported in the PPSV/PCV era. Outbreak strains in
lower respiratory tract infection outbreaks are included
within PCV13 but are covered more fully by PPSV23 (Fig.
3) [115]. Along with the observation that most outbreaks
occurred where vaccination/revaccination rates were low
suggests that effective vaccination programs play a key
role in preventing outbreaks. Providing vaccination is par-
ticularly vital in highly susceptible populations, like indi-
viduals in LTCF. Primary adult pneumococcal vaccination
is recommended for healthy adults 65 years or older, im-
munocompromised individuals, and those with certain
chronic diseases [115, 116]. Providing a 5-year PPSV23 re-
vaccination, if indicated per US CDC recommendations,
should be considered to retain sufficient immunity [117–
121]. In regards to conjunctivitis, vaccination likely has no
role in prevention since these strains do not express cap-
sules, the antigenic target of the current vaccines.
The nasopharyngeal carrier state is an important fea-
ture in transmission of S. pneumoniae strains both
within households and across regions. There is recogni-
tion that carrier-attributed transmission is important
among families, with children acting as a reservoir [122–
125]. In a global view, large events offer opportunities
for widespread dissemination of S. pneumoniae strains.
Events like the Hajj, the annual Islamic pilgrimage to
Mecca, can lead to acquisition of new S. pneumoniae
strains in attendees [126]. While the colonization has
been important in dissemination of S. pneumoniae, in
outbreaks we found evidence of additional transmission
from other sources. Furthermore, there is a need to
Fig. 4 Modes of person-to-person transmission of Streptococcus pneumoniae
Fig. 5 Simplified description of serious Streptococcus pneumoniae infections, with a focus on initial respiratory tract disease. Death, not
represented in the figure, can occur at any illness stage with varying survival probability based on disease stage
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explore the transmission dynamics of S. pneumoniae
with other respiratory pathogens, and the role of the
time-order of co-infections [127]. Pneumococcal infec-
tion severity has been observed to increase with influ-
enza in murine models [128], and influenza and other
respiratory viruses have been associated with increased
pneumococcal colonization and infection [129, 130]. In
outbreak settings, interventions targeted at preventing
or treating co-infections has potential to interrupt trans-
mission. The CDC provided an interim recommendation
for the use of PPSV23 as an adjunctive intervention dur-
ing the 2009 influenza pandemic [131]. Data supports
the use of pneumococcal vaccine in future influenza
pandemics [132]. Additionally, annual influenza vaccin-
ation has potential to mitigate pneumococcal risk [133].
However, interventions targeted specifically for pneumo-
coccus are still required to prevent pneumococcal out-
breaks, as evidenced by a pneumococcal outbreak
occurring in a military barrack with comprehensive in-
fluenza vaccination coverage [82].
Compared to the US CDC’s Active Bacterial Core Sur-
veillance 2015 report for S. pneumoniae [134], reported
outbreaks are much more likely to involve
non-susceptible pneumococcal strains. The difference is
likely related to publication bias favoring non-
susceptible outbreak strains. Multitudes of pneumococ-
cal disease outbreaks probably occur but are undetected
due to inadequate diagnostic methods or effective anti-
biotic treatments, and we likely only see a fraction of the
full burden of pneumococcal disease. If antibiotic resist-
ance increases in the future, recognized pneumococcal
outbreaks may occur with increasing frequency. How-
ever, childhood pneumococcal vaccination programs
have been associated with a decrease in antibiotic resist-
ance for vaccine serotypes in both children and adults
[135], and may provide a way to reduce antibiotic
resistance.
In future pneumococcal outbreaks, efforts should be
made to rapidly identify cases and carriers to isolate
them. For case linkage, we recommend using molecular
typing methods, such as whole-genome sequencing
(WGS), PFGE, or MLST, rather than serotyping alone.
WGS is preferred over PFGE/MLST, but when not pos-
sible PFGE/MLST should be used. Recent outbreak in-
vestigations have been moving in this direction. When
an outbreak is recognized, prompt vaccination or revac-
cination is important, but due to the delay until immun-
ity occurs, infection-prevention measures are imperative.
There is evidence that S. pneumoniae may be transmit-
ted via droplets, so appropriate infection prevention
measures should be taken (i.e. droplet precautions).
While use of prophylactic antibiotics have had success in
controlling outbreaks, the risk of antibiotic resistance
developing should be considered carefully. Antibiotic
non-susceptibility has previously developed secondary to
antibiotic prophylaxis [70]. Rather, it may be appropriate
to limit antibiotic prophylaxis to exposed contacts who
are at high-risk of disease. Use of prophylactic antibiotics
should be evaluated in light of the outbreak size, the
pace of new cases, existing antibiotic resistances, and
other contextual features. In conjunctivitis outbreaks,
prevention efforts should focus on infection-prevention,
since vaccination confers no protection against this dis-
ease manifestation.
The major strength of our review involves fewer re-
strictions on inclusion, allowing a more expansive as-
sessment compared to prior pneumococcal outbreak
reviews. We updated prior reviews with more recently
published outbreaks. Our review also explored features
of transmission and infection dynamics in S. pneumo-
niae, which has not previously been commented on in
prior outbreak reviews. Lastly, since we could not report
every possible combination of variables that may be of
interest to readers, we have provided a data file contain-
ing all of the information extracted from the articles
(Additional file 2: Table S1).
There are several limitations to our review. While our
search terms were general, it is possible that our review
missed articles of interest. We attempted to minimize
this by searching through the references of included arti-
cles and other review articles. Some of these further
identified articles were in journals not indexed by
PubMed and would not have been identified regardless
of search terms. One article not identified by our search
reported a serotype 5 outbreak among unaccompanied
minors in the US during 2014 [136]. Our conclusions
are consistent with the unidentified article and this art-
icle provides further evidence for co-infection transmis-
sion. Our search was limited to only including articles
available in English, but only 8 non-English were identi-
fied as eligible via abstracts. Lastly, our review is limited
to published outbreaks. However, our conclusions re-
garding transmission and infection progression remain
valid, because only one example is needed to show this
can occur.
Conclusion
S. pneumoniae causes outbreaks of various clinical mani-
festations. There is sufficient evidence that S. pneumo-
niae colonization is not an obligate prerequisite for
disease. To prevent the initial occurrence of outbreaks,
maintaining high vaccination rates and revaccination per
US CDC/ACIP recommendations is likely to be effective.
Once an outbreak occurs, efforts should be directed to
infection-prevention strategies, like droplet precautions,
and vaccination. The usage of prophylactic antibiotics
for exposed individuals may lead to development of anti-
biotic resistance, and is not currently recommended by
Zivich et al. Pneumonia           (2018) 10:11 Page 11 of 15
the CDC. In scenarios of pneumococcal infection
co-circulating with another pathogen, interventions tar-
geted at the co-circulating infections may mitigate
pneumococcal transmission. Interestingly, conjunctival
pneumococcal outbreaks have been linked to bacteria
that do not express a capsule and would therefore not
be covered by the currently-licensed pneumococcal vac-
cines. Despite being discovered over 100 years ago, there
is still much to uncover regarding S. pneumoniae.
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